Scholars Crossing
Faculty Publications and Presentations

Helms School of Government

Fall 1988

Pinochet’s Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the
Chilean Church
Stephen R. Bowers
Liberty University, srbowers2@liberty.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs
Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Political Science Commons, and the
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Bowers, Stephen R., "Pinochet’s Plebiscite and the Catholics: The Dual Role of the Chilean Church" (1988).
Faculty Publications and Presentations. 83.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/gov_fac_pubs/83

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Helms School of Government at Scholars Crossing. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.

Vol. ISO, No.2

51

Fall 1988

Pinochet's Plebiscite and the Catholics:
The Dual Role of the Chilean Chupch

By STEPHEN R. BOWERS

F

or decades the Catholic church and the Chilean military embraced common concerns.
Each was an advocate of stability, law and order,
social harmony, and an opponent of radical political movements. Their occupation of such extensive common political, economic, and social
ground made them natural allies. However, as
the church, fearing the stronger attraction of
both the Protestant faith and Marxist-Leninist
ideology among the country's working class,
could no longer confine itself to this limited role
and became more politically and socially active,
the two allies became opponents. 1 By 1975, the
Catholic church was in the forefront of opposition to Chile's military government and was becoming the focal point for opposition activities.
Yet, as Chile prepared for its plebiscite in 1988,
the relationship between the regime and the
church experienced yet another transformation
from that of distinct adversaries to one of uneasy
members of a common system, each struggling
to define the limits of their mutual authority over
different aspects of Chilean society. In the volatile period preceding the plebiscite, the junta became increasingly sensitive to clerical intrusions
into the political sphere while the church leadership, more cautious than in the earlier part of the
decade and forced into the dual role of both advocate and adversary, endeavored to avoid secular manipulation, excessive political activism,
and the internal dissension that could jeopardize
the church's institutional framework and inhibit
the role that it might play after the 5 October
plebiscite.
By 1986 the military regime was becoming
increasingly cautious in dealing with the nation's most important social institution. Its overall goal was to utilize the Catholic church as an
instrument of regime authority or, failing that,
to contain church opposition to Pinochet's policies. In several important respects, the junta was

successful in manipulating the church in such a
way as to draw clerical support from an essentially reluctant church leadership. The best example of the regime's skillful handling of the
religious community was the visit of Pope John
Paul II in 1987. Yet, in other instances, the government faced severe criticism from numerous
church leaders and treated the church as an opponent, thus intensifying its image as an oppressive regime bent on consistent violation of
human rights. At its rhetorical worst, the government resorted to accusations such as that of
Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez who suggested early in 1988 that the church represented
one of the three greatest obstacles to peace in the
country."
As the process of Chile's democratization has
proceeded, the relationship between the junta
and the church has become particularly significant as an indication of the ability of the regime
to work with non-governmental power centers
in guiding national development along a democratic path. The increasingly violent context of
Chilean politics in 1987 and 1988 has served as
a reminder of the difficulties of resolving the
junta's troubled relationship with the society
that it must govern both today and, should it win
the plebiscite, in the future. It is the purpose of
this article to examine the nature of the relationship betwen the regime and the church during
this critical period and to evaluate how each institution has dealt with the strains that have become typical of Ctlilean politics. That evaluation may be useful in making projections about
the future of Chilean society in the era after the
plebiscite.

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
One of the most striking indications of the intense strains within Chilean society has been an
increasing pattern of violence as the country has
moved cautiously toward democratization.
Most frequently associated with the recent wave
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of terror has been the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a small group originally believed to have only 1,000 to 2,000 hardcore
members and long associated with attacks
against electrical, telephone, and transportation
systems, foreign-owned banks and mining companies, the U.S. Embassy, and pro-junta newspapers. By 1986, FPMR activities had expanded
to include not only kidnappings, but also the attempt on Augusto Pinochet's life in September. 3
In November 1987, a series of terrorist actions
against National Electric Power, Inc., apparently the work of the FPMR, left a vast region
from Copiapo to Temuco without electricity
while simultaneous attacks against the Santiago
bus system resulted in the burning of three
buses. 4 In March 1988, the Chilean attorney
general Ambrosio Rodriguez warned that there
would be an increase in terrorist attacks as the
date of the plebiscite approached. These undertakings, he explained, were part of a political
strategy aimed at inducing a so-called drug effect that would prevent people from being fully
responsive to political events during that sensitive period. By the spring, violence intensified
as terrorists disabled the Pacifico Steel Enterprise railroad by planting bombs along the railway line, thus causing panic among the residents of the Coquimbo region. Strikes against
Santiago's electrical system became routine,
with the result that vast industrial sectors of the
city were often without power. Even radio stations served as convenient targets of terrorist actions. Although FPMR is given credit for most
of these incidents, there were rumors of involvement by the Peruvian terrorist organization
Shining Path. As a result, the Carabineros director general Rodolfo Stange was compelled to issue a public statement in June 1988, in an effort
to reduce popular fears of such foreign intervention. According to Stange, the violent attacks on
a Carabineros barracks in May, seen by some as
a Shining Path action, was the work of domestic
"extremists," probably the FPMR, who had
promptly fled when the Chilean military came to
the aid of the Carabineros. 5 Nevertheless, Chilean authorities insisted that there was considerable foreign support for local terrorists and Ad
Hoc Military Prosecutor Fernando Torres suggested in February 1988 that out of a group of
over 100 cases he had tried, "at least 30 to 40
percent have been trained in Cuba or the USSR.
They have confessed to this and it is no secret."6
The turbulence of this era was characterized
not only by an increase in domestic violence but
also by a continuation and, in some cases, an

intensification of international criticism of the
military regime. As a result of the barrage of
hostile pronouncements about the government,
junta representatives have long been embroiled
in bitter debates with numerous governments
and international organizations, disputes likely
to inhibit the operation of the government
should the regime prevail in the plebiscite. The
U.S. Department of State has been a leading
critic of junta policies, including the plebiscite
that served as the cornerstone of Pinochet's process for transition to civilian rule. The official
response to the State Department's negative assessment of the plebiscite was offered by Admiral Jose Toribio Merino who, in a statement in
December 1987, suggested that it is U. S., not
Chilean elections, that are open to criticism because of the low turnout in U.S. presidential
elections and the inconvenient hours during
which a person may vote. 7 The United Nations
added its voice to the chorus of international
critics of Pinochet's regime in March 1988, with
a resolution condemning the junta for human
rights violations. Chile's ambassador to the
United Nations responded to the resolution by
denouncing it as interference in Chilean internal
affairs and suggesting that it was motivated by
"political interests" rather than a concern for human rights and that the resolution was "invalid
from the beginning because it was drafted by
such an untrustworthy government-that of
Mexico."s Finally, in July 1988, the European
Parliament issued a unanimous resolution calling upon all Chilean democratic parties to reject Pinochet in the 5 October plebiscite. The
spokesman for the Chilean Foreign Ministry
promptly denounced the decision as "grotesque"
and labeled members of the Parliament "ignorant" and suffering from a "distorted view of
Chilean reality."9

THE CHURCH AS AN ADVOCATE
The regime's difficulties with international organizations and foreign governments have been
matched by severe strains in its relationship with
the church since 1975. Harassment of church
workers and even the deaths of foreign priests in
police searches of Santiago's slums were indications of open and bitter official hostility toward
the church. This attitude was dramatically reflected in actions against church organizations
such as the Vicariate of Solidarity-the Catholic church's human rights office. Pinochet himself described this organization as "more communistic than the communists." Apparently in
retaliation for the Vicariate's accusations of hu-
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man rights violations, numerous anonymous attacks were directed against church buildings,
clergy, and lay workers. In addition, church
workers were often the targets of bombings,
threats, kidnappings, and beatings. 10
Yet, in spite of the extremely harsh churchregime relationship that developed since 1975,
the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1987 demonstrated Pinochet's ability to back away from
overt and sometimes violent confrontations with
the church and to utilize that organization, indirectly at least, as an advocate of his policies.
While there were papal gestures that supported
the opposition, the pope gave significant indications of support for the regime. The pope's critical gestures fell into four categories: meetings
with opposition leaders, demands for greater
popular participation in politics, a call for an assertive church, and recognition of the Vicariate
of Solidarity for its "devotion on behalf of l1Uman rights." Yet, these indications of support for
Pinochet's opponents were balanced by a series
of actions clearly supportive of the regime. One
of the most important symbolic moves during
the papal visit was the pope's appearance on the
presidential balcony with Pinochet and his family and his prayers that were offered with the
general and his family. In addition, the pope
echoed at least some of Pinochet's anticommunist sentiments before an audience of bishops and
priests with his denunciation of "foreign influences" that are attempting to "subjugate or distort the national will." Finally, after listening to
shanty town delegates at a mass rally, the pope
cautioned grassroots church organizations to
avoid taking direct political positions. As the
visit ended there was general recognition that it
had made the split within the church a matter of
public attention while the attendant disturbances
did more harm to the image of opposition
groups than to that of the government. The
words of comfort that the pope gave to the government had greater impact in promoting more
cautious church behavior than those remarks
that might have supported the opposition. I I

THE SUPPRESSION OF LIBERAL
TENDENCIES
The relationship between the ecclesiastical
leadership and the Vicariate of Solidarity has
demonstrated the shift in church policy in recent
years. The activities of this organization exemplify the attitude of the more liberal element of
the church leadership toward the military regime. The Vicariate has championed the cause
of human rights by criticizing official abuses and
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by offering aid-food, shelter, clothing, and legal support-to victims of abuse. At the same
time, it has defended the poor and preached its
own brand of liberation theology, which stresses
the need for Catholics to become involved in
movements for social justice. A few Vicariate
associates, such as former member Ignacio Gutierrez, have even advocated the desirability of
revolution, thus prompting the Chilean interior
minister's 1988 charge that the Vicariate is a
"counterintelligence organization at the service

The suppression of liberal tendencies within the
church-something which was facilitated by the
church hierarchy-was accompanied by governmental pressures against elements of the church
media.
of the opposition" and dedicated to providing
moral and logistical support for terrorism. 12
However, by 1986 the Vicariate faced a more
cautious church leadership that seemed inclined
to return to a more "pastoral" mission. The demand by Bishop Antonio Moreno, vicar of the
northern zone of Santiago since 1986, that
priests not participate in any form of protest
against the government is typical of the position
taken by many of the more recently appointed
church leaders. When a group of lay people
went to Bishop Moreno to describe a brutal
search and seizure raid in their neighborhood,
the bishop responded that the soldiers and the
police were "only doing their duty and obeying
the laws." This cautious attitude undoubtedly
reflected a concern about the alienation of traditional Catholics who have played such an important role in supporting the church and making it
possible for church structures to serve those in
need of assistance. It is, of course, important to
note that the Catholic church is not a monolithic
body either at the popular or at the elite level.
Disagreements over fundamental political questions exist at every level of the organization and
thus mandate caution on the part of ecclesiastical leaders who are concerned about the institutional solidity of the church.
The suppression of liberal tendencies within
the church-something which was facilitated
by the church hierarchy-was accompanied by
governmental pressures against elements of the
church media. One of the most important media
reflections of liberal tendencies within the

Wodd Affairs

54

church is the monthly political journal Analisis,
published by the Academy of Christian Humanism. The Academy, founded in 1975, is a church
organization that supports the research of numerous social scientists suppressed by the junta.
While Analisis continues to serve as a reminder
of the residual vestiges of a free press in Chile,
it has been the target of numerous attacks by
government officials stung by its critical commentary. With the approach of the plebiscite,
authorities became increasingly sensitive to critical reportage. In June 1988, Valparaiso Naval
Prosecutor Miguel Angel Munoz used the military justice code to take legal action against the
journal for its publication of an article dealing
with the Chilean arms trade, arresting both the
deputy director of the magazine and the author
of the offending article. Analisis director, Juan
Pablo Cardenas, was already serving a limited
jail sentence for having "offended" President
Pinochet. 13 The campaign against the Catholic
media has also been directed against Radio La
Voz de la Costa, a Catholic radio station that
broadcasts educational programs to peasants
and other rural residents. In February 1988,
sponsors of the radio station were asked to cancel their contracts with the station unless they
wanted to face reprisals. This request was evidently made on behalf of the ultra-rightist terrorist group "Chilean Anticommunist Action"
(ACHA) and was coupled with a death threat
sent by letter to the priest who runs the station.
In March, the shop of one of the radio station's
sponsors was bombed in retaliation for its continued support for La Voz de la Costa. Chilean
human rights attorneys claim that ACHA is
closely linked with Chile's security services.
These actions should be viewed not simply as
attacks on the church, but rather as part of what
Jaime Moreno Laval, president of the Santiago
Journalists Association, describes as a concerted campaign of threats and pressure against
journalists as the date for the plebiscite approaches. 14
Authorities have, however, needed more than
the mere silencing of critical elements within the
church-supported media. On the eve of the plebiscite, authorities enjoyed at least some success
in drawing expressions of support from clerical
figures. Given the importance of the plebiscite
as an element of Pinochet's policies, the regime
has been eager to solicit support from prominent
church figures, thus in advance strengthening
the position of the junta should it be successful
in the plebiscite. An important measure of such
support came in July 1988 when the Episcopal

Conference president, Msgr. Carlos Gonzales,
generally seen as sympathetic to liberal church
elements, met with the director of Chile's Voting
Service to review measures being taken in preparation for the plebiscite. Following the meeting, Gonzales declared that he was favorably
impressed by the long lists of registered voters,
the computer equipment, and the supplies of paper for printing secret ballots and felt that they
were clear evidence that the electoral process
was well organized and secure against any form
of fraud. The director of the Voting Service,
Juan Ignacio Garcia, in turn, expressed the government's deep satisfaction with his observation
that "the fact that a church authority expressed
his support for the system is satisfying" and is "a
positive message to all Chileans." 15
An important reason for the change in the
church's recent pronouncements-in addition
to some of the papal pronouncements in the
1987 visit-is the changing composition of ruling ecclesiastical bodies, entities that were once
dominated by regime critics but are now balanced between liberals and conservatives. The
evenness of the split within the church leadership is reflected in the almost even liberalconservative division within the twenty-nine
member Bishop's Council. Although Juan Francisco Cardinal Fresno Larrain, archbishop of
Santiago since 1983, was a theological conservative and an enthusiastic supporter of the military regime, he and the Bishop's Council have
sometimes taken positions that advocate the
causes espoused by Chile's opposition. For example, in 1986 the bishops joined in the call for
a general strike against the government by
unions and professional groups. Cardinal
Fresno has been equally outspoken in his demands for changes in the Pinochet constitution
and for a transition from military to civilian
rule. Yet, the council cannot be regarded as a
captive of the liberal faction of the leadership.
The proposal that Cardinal Fresno made in 1985
for a national accord is based on a formula that
would favor the nation's center-right political
groups at the expense of the left, something that
pleases the government far more than the activists among the poor and the working class who
see the left as their champion. The tendency of
the council to fluctuate between the postures of
advocate and adversary illustrates the desire of
the clerical leadership to occupy a more balanced position. 16
Late in 1986, Cardinal Fresno's criticism of
the government was softened even more by actions that many see, at best, as supportive of a
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restrained church role or, at worst, as an effort to
ally the church with Pinochet. This shift away
from overt antigovernmental activism became
most apparent following the imposition of a
state of siege after the attempt on Pinochet's life
on 7 September 1986. Indicative of this less critical posture was Cardinal Fresno's decision to
proceed with the traditional 'Te Deum" celebration in Santiago's cathedral on 18 September,
Chile's independence day. Even though a large
sector of the clergy and laity called for a suspension of the celebration because of regime attacks
against the church, Cardinal Fresno summoned
the Santiago clergy to announce that the
church's mission was "transcendent" and that
two-hundred-year-old traditions such as the "Te
Deum" should not be broken in response to
passing political controversies. This ceremony,
which was attended by General Pinochet and
several junta members, was denounced by the
Chilean liberation theologian, Ronaldo Munoz,
who described it as the shepherds marching
"into the plaza arm in arm with the wolves that
are scattering and destroying the flock." 17 Realistically, it must be recognized that these actions
have not constituted a "sell-out" on the part of
the church leadership, but are, rather, important
steps toward facilitation of a constructive church
role in Chile after the plebiscite, regardless of
the outcome.
THE CHURCH AS AN ADVERSARY
Yet, with the approach of the plebiscite and in
spite of these conciliatory gestures, the church
did not abandon its adversarial role and expressed critical views on fundamental political
questions. One of the most important of these
was the moral validity of the plebiscite itself. In
spite of some praise for the electoral machinery,
in June 1988 the Episcopal Conference released
a statement of its concern that certain other more
essential conditions should be met for the plebiscite to be considered morally valid. The first
condition was that the opposition must be given
more access to the media, especially the national television channel. Most independent observers agreed with the suggestion that the
fifteen minutes of television time allocated for
both opposition and pro-regime groups each
evening, an arrangement that did not even begin
until September, would not be sufficient or fair
in view of the government's formal domination
of the television broadcast system. It was also
important, the statement continued, that the
states of exception, with the limits they imposed

upon political liberties, be lifted so there could
be free and open debate. Furthermore, according to the conference, government officials and
members of the armed forces who were responsible for management of the electoral machinery
should not simultaneously be active supporters
of a specific plebiscite option. Finally, the "aggressive, disqualifying, and exclusionary language" associated with public discussion of the
plebiscite should be eliminated in order to maintain the air of calm deliberation required for an
orderly and peaceful plebiscite. In this context,
one is reminded of the numerous statementssuch as that by Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez in March 1988-that "political anarchy, social disorder, and insecurity" would follow a
plebiscite vote rejecting the government candidate. Further and even more explicit distrust of
the plebiscite process was expressed by Carlos
Camus, Bishop of Linares and a former secretary general of the Episcopal Conference, who,
when asked about General Pinochet's statement
that he would "overwhelm" the opposition in the
plebiscite, asked, "What is he going to overwhelm them with, I wonder? Will it be with
votes or with machinegunsT 18
An equally fundamental issue upon which
church leaders also made direct critical comments was General Pinochet's political future.
In January 1988, Msgr. Raul Silva Henriquez,
Santiago's retired archbishop who presently
holds the office of cardinal, observed that Pinochet did not want to relinquish his office and, in
all probability, would prefer to die as a dictator.
According to Cardinal Silva, Pinochet's days are
numbered because he will not be allowed to remain in office and if, upon being defeated in the
plebiscite, he leaves Chile he will be killed. This
was evidently a sensitive point within Pinochet's
inner political circle and, according to some reports, in the event of a defeat, the general would
not leave the country but rather take refuge on
Robinson Crusoe Island, a remote Chilean possession in the Pacific. Following Msgr. Silva's
comments, the Chilean Foreign Ministry filed a
formal complaint with the Vatican against the
Cardinal and denounced his remarks as "not
conducive to national harmony," while Sergio
Onofre Jarpa, president of the pro-Pinochet National Renewal party, described them as "incredible." Cardinal Silva had already demonstrated
his disdain for Pinochet by refusing to send
Christmas greetings to the general, instead
sending formal Christmas messages to the relatives of five young communists who had
disappeared in September 1987. ACHA has
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claimed credit for abducting the five. In February 1988, ACHA threatened to kill Cardinal
Silva because of his public statements about human rights violations in Chile. 19
The growing number of disappearances
among the ranks of those expressing opposition
to the junta was yet another issue about which
the church was increasingly outspoken. In April
1988, the Vicariate issued a statement in which
it declared that the worst cases of human rights
violations in Chile were the increased campaign

The church has played a dual role in that
sometimes it has been an advocate of regime
politics, while on other occasions it has been a
critic.

of political kidnappings and the arrest and torture of people in secret detention centers run by
the National Intelligence Center (CNI). The
Santiago Archbishop's Office charged that the
methods employed and the timing of events supported fears that the repressive tactics of the
early Pinochet years were being revived as the
country neared the date of the plebiscite. Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno and his close advisors
stressed that the Catholic church could not remain indifferent to such events and that finding
the missing should be one of the highest public
priorities. 20
The church's pursuit of a restrained adversarial role was not without its costs for those leaders associated with public statements of opposition to regime policies and practices. In May
1988, four priests who signed a document which
asserted that General Pinochet and the military
regime were "morally disqualified" to rule Chile
and called upon Pinochet to resign were arrested
by a Santiago military prosecutor. Episcopal
Conference president Carlos Gonzales, widely
viewed as a supporter of the more liberal line,
was the target of bitter personal attacks in a
seventeen-page publication signed by Chilean
Catholic Action, an organization of proPinochet Catholics. Death threats, such as that
made by ACHA against Cardinal Silva, were another frequent consequence of the leadership's
adversarial functions. Even petty vandalismsuch as the assault with red paint on the home
and automobile of the executive direct of the Vicariate of Solidarity in October 1987-was em-

ployed against those who criticized the junta's
abuses. 21
Yet, it is clear that while the church was willing to oppose the regime on issues that have
moral implications, particularly the human
rights abuses cited above, it does not seek political power for itself. Although it has emerged as
the most important nongovernmental institution
since 1973, it shows no desire to assume the role
of a "shadow government" or an auxiliary state
apparatus. It is sometimes an adversary but
never an aspirant for political authority. The determination of clerical leaders to avoid direct involvement in secular matters was reflected in the
Episcopal Conference's June 1988 declaration
of neutrality in the plebiscite. In addition, when
Bolivian groups requested clerical mediation in
the Bolivian-Chilean sea-outlet issue in May
1988, the church leadership was quick to deny
any authority to engage in such an action, once
again stressing that the Catholic church has no
aspirations for direct political authority, especially on questions that lack profound, direct
moral implications. 22

THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL
ACTIVISM
Over the years, the ecclesiastical leadership
seems to have arrived at a consensus with regard
to the limits to political activism. A key point of
that consensus is that prophetic statements by
themselves are not likely to bring about a fundamental change in the regime. As Brian H. Smith
has observed, the institutional resources of the
Catholic church were more important than its
moral voice in alleviating the effects of repressive government, meaning that its role as an advocate of acceptance of the regime could bring
important benefits to its parishioners. Accordingly, by avoiding elite-level confrontations
with the regime, the church has been able to focus on providing important services, such as
communications networks and legal and economic assistance, to those who have been victims of repression. Thus, the role of the church
has been enlarged rather than diminished under
the military regime, and the Catholic leadership
has drawn closer to an understanding with regard to the limits of the clerical political activism characteristic of its adversarial role. When
newly appointed Bishop Jorge Medina went to
Pinochet to reaffirm his loyalty to the regime, he
was making a dramatic statement of the selfimposed limits that now apply to the church's
role in politics. Yet, that loyalty does not imply
subservience or a willingness on the part of the
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church to allow its leadership to be undermined. 23
This understanding is clearly the result of a
realistic evaluation of the church's mission by
the ecclesiastical hierarchy-especially the Vatican leadership, which has recently appointed
conservative bishops who are more supportive
of the government-rather than a consequence
of direct military pressure against the church.
The exercise of restraint by both the church and
the junta, which generally refrained from direct
threats to the core interests of the Catholic
church, is a tribute to the political wisdom of
both the Chilean military figures who act as political leaders and the ecclesiastical figures who
enjoy political prominence. When Bishop Medina made his journey to Pinochet, he was rewarded for his expression of support by a ceremony in which the dictator presented him with a
pectoral cross made of lapis lazuli. After all,
military authorities can accept a church that engages in an active pastoral mission but refrains
from direct plays for secular authority even if it
does venture into the political sphere when it
sees a moral issue at stake. Yet, the church's political role remains modest and restrained, thus
protecting its ecclesiastical structure and allowing the church to serve its parishioners-including those who have been victims of the regime's
repression.

CONCLUSIONS
Policies of the Catholic church in the period
just prior to the plebiscite were not a sell-out,
but rather an effort to facilitate a transition to
democratic government and avoid the violence
that might be associated with a left-wing overthrow of the Pinochet government. The church
has played a dual role in that sometimes it has
been an advocate of regime policies while on
other occasions it has been a critic. On balance,
clerical leaders are most concerned about pursuit of a policy that allows maximum attention
to the needs of parishioners while also directing
attention to political controversies when crucial
moral questions are at issue.
A crucial factor stimulating adoption of this
approach is that, by 1987 and 1988, the core
interests of the church were not being threatened
by the junta. The worst excesses of earlier years
had stopped and, while they occurred on an occasional basis, direct physical threats and harassment were not a dominant part of regime
tactics for dealing with the church. The achievement of better relations with the church supports
the view that Pinochet is one of the region's

most adroit politicians and his skill in dealing
with the church in this period is a tribute to his
political acumen. In spite of serious disputes between the government and the church, Pinochet
was able to maintain contacts with the church
leadership. At the same time, while Pinochet
was critical of the activities of the Vicariate as
well as of activist priests who attempted to mobilize the opposition, the junta did not endeavor
to destroy the church leadership or intrude directly into the management of the church.
A less perceptive government might have
concentrated on attempting to undermine the
church by attacking its bases of economic or financial support. There is no indication today of
a serious official effort to undermine the church
in such a fashion. In short, the Chilean government may have been in the hands of the military,
but the responsible officers recognized the fundamentals of Chilean history with the prominent
role assigned to the church and did not brutally
defy tradition. By pursuing a more restrained
policy toward the church, Pinochet was able to
maintain the appearance of a loyal, practicing
Catholic whose main desire was that the church
give more attention to pastoral concerns than to
political issues. He did not challenge the special
position of the church as a common element in
Chilean life and an integral part of the nation's
Hispanic heritage. Such an approach was not
only a critical element of regime policy prior to
the plebiscite but crucial to Pinochet's prospects
for governing with any measure of success in the
event of a "yes" vote in October. For the Catholic church, maintenance of a qualified truce with
the government was essential to the leadership's
hopes of performing both a pastoral and a humanitarian mission in the years following the
plebiscite.
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